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Of International Law, Semi-colonial Thailand, and Imperial Ghosts is wide-ranging
in research, nuanced in analysis, and replete with archival nuggets and food for
thought. Prabhakar makes a number of important and interesting contributions in this
paper.
First, he convincingly substantiates a practical and theoretical distinction between
colonies and semi-colonies. He goes on to demonstrate the continuing relevance
of this distinction to the engagement of former colonies and semi-colonies with
international law. To this end Prabhakar uses territorial disputes – and specifically
the decision of the ICJ in the Temple of Preah Vihear case between Cambodia and
Thailand – as an example of the relative advantage that former colonies enjoy over
former semi-colonies through access to colonial stationery.
Second, he draws attention to the discarding of the colony/semi-colony distinction in
the essentially European universalisation of international law. As Prabhakar notes
(pg. 71): “One would assume that dissimilar escapades – i.e. semi-colonialism,
colonial rule, or any other model in between – in Asia or elsewhere must necessarily
lead to plural post-colonialisms…Yet, as the Temple of Preah Vihear case explains,
the ICJ as the ‘principle judicial organ’ for international law’s universalism paints all
histories with a broad European brush.”
Third, and this is the theme that I want to explore further in this brief comment, he
highlights the importance of historical contextualisation to the work of international
lawyers.
The ‘turn to history’ in international law is, of course, very well recognised and
very important. (See, for instance, Janne Nijman explaining the turn to history in
international law and Martti Koskenniemi illustrating it.) The turn to history stands,
first, for the relevance of the history of international law to international law. But it
stands, also, for the relevance of the historical method to the practice of international
law.
Anne Orford, in defending anachronism in the study of international legal history, has
highlighted the quintessentially historical nature of the legal exercise of engaging
with precedent (see, for instance, pg. 172-3). When international lawyers invoke a
decision or instrument from the past – whether near or far – their reliance on that
decision or instrument must take account of its historical context, and interpret it in
that specific context.
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This conclusion may seem obvious, but historical contextualisation is problematically
absent from international legal discourse. Prabhakar handily demonstrates this,
by drawing attention to the Preah Vihear majority judgment’s a-contextual (and
consequently, arguably incorrect) interpretation of historical facts (pgs. 56-6, 64-7).
For instance, Prabhakar points to the possibility that the Siamese rulers did not
appreciate the context and consequences of the ‘treaty’ relied on by the ICJ in its
findings in favour of Cambodia. Similarly, he notes that while maps were a form
of territorial delimitation for France, for Siam they were a visual representation
of political authority, rather than a precise demarcation of territory. These
miscommunications, arising from the clash between ‘oriental’ and ‘occidental’ ideas,
find no significance in the modern doctrines of international law. These doctrines
allow limited scope to the concept of duress, and do not allow for the possibility
that maps may have more than one signification. Their nuanced application to the
particular historical context of the Preah Vihear dispute would have required the ICJ
to engage in a contextual historical interpretation. It is this failure that Prabhakar’s
paper so clearly highlights.
Consequently, Prabhakar’s paper is much more than a theoretical call for the
recognition of the sui generis status of semi-colonies in international law. It is a
critique of the Preah Vihear decision on the grounds that it does not contextually
interpret the relevant historical facts. And in that sense it is a critique of international
law generally, which has strait-jacketed the Preah Vihear decision as a leading
case on estoppel in international law (pg. 70), notwithstanding the questionable
interpretation of the conduct which was found to bind Thailand.
The relevance of historical facts and methods to the task of the international lawyer
is self-evident, if not obvious. Insights from other disciplines, while perhaps less
obviously relevant, are just as relevant in practice.
Some applications of inter-disciplinary insights are readily apparent. For instance,
economic analyses may play a role in the drafting and interpretation of economic
laws; social facts may shape laws intended to encourage or discourage particular
social phenomena; geographical facts will undoubtedly be relevant to delimitation
exercises.
Other applications are less apparent, but just as important. For instance, interpretive
debates may be usefully understood, and perhaps even resolved, as clashes
of interpretive or epistemic communities. Acknowledging the anthropocentric
limitations of criminal law is a necessary precursor to its extension to artificial
intelligence. Understanding the historical and political origins of the need for
extraordinary protection of foreign investment can influence the adjudication of
investor-state disputes. The extensive literature on militarised vision and drone
theory can introduce critical insights into the law and practice of targeting in armed
conflict.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that these inter-disciplinary analyses are entirely
absent from the discourse of international law. Indeed, international law scholarship
from critical, third world, feminist, Marxist, literary and economy perspectives
frequently draws on such insights. By way of example, see Michael Waibel (Chapter
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7), Christiane Wilke (Chapter 12), and a recent issue of the Australian Feminist Law
Journal.
Arguably, however, there is space for far greater integration of inter-disciplinary
insights into mainstream scholarship. And there is a need to question settled canons
of international law from the perspective of these inter-disciplinary insights – as
Prabhakar has done – to determine whether they demand re-evaluation.
Notwithstanding the utility and importance of inter-disciplinary insights, the law in
general seems to fare very poorly in its engagement with these insights.
I have previously argued that parts of the SCM Agreement of the WTO seem to
ignore the explicitly economic rationale of that instrument. Surabhi Ranganathan
has argued that law of the sea limits on the continental shelf ignore geographical
facts. Notwithstanding the increasing recognition that investment treaties do not
actually promote foreign investment, investment arbitration jurisprudence is replete
with expansive interpretations of treaty rights based on preambular references to
investment-promotion.
I would suggest that these are not isolated examples, but evidence of a systemic
inability to engage with other disciplines. Substantiating that intuition, unfortunately,
is beyond the scope of this short piece.
Building on Prabhakar’s arguments, in this post I have emphasised the utility of inter-
disciplinary analyses to the practice of international law, and have noted the seeming
failure of the law in engaging with facts from other disciplines. I must apologise for
the summary form of these arguments, and for their reliance on inductive reasoning.
Neither of these shortcomings will, I hope, prevent engagement with the principled
implications of these arguments.
In concluding, I would like to thank the editors of the Völkerrechtsblog for the
opportunity to contribute to this symposium.
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